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A little over a year ago when I first suggested the topic of this issue to
the editors of the Journal of Law and Public Policy, I thought that one
reason supporting the proposal was the timeliness of the subject. I could not
have possibly foreseen how media responses to the events of the past year
would receive even more banner headline attention than in the past.
Moreover, I certainly could not have anticipated that there would be charges
that in some cases media representatives had instigated or at least partially
contributed to some of the biggest tragedies of the year. I think it is
important to point out the genesis of the idea to make it clear that this issue
of the Journaldid not originate as a response to the tragic death of Princess

* Professor of Law and Affiliate Professor of Philosophy, University of Florida.
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Diana,1 to the media orgy over Monica Lewinsky,2 or any other particular
blot on the media copybook.3 Instead, the idea came from a growing sense
of unease, discomfort, and outright alarm at the burgeoning public mistrust
of the journalistic community. After all, democracy is from the outset
dependent upon the free flow of reliable information and opinion.4 As all
the contributors to this issue agree, sound journalism is essential to the
success of our democratic experiment. Our challenge is to see what steps are
needed to encourage a return to sound journalistic practices.
In the view of contemporary journalistic practice, the panel of experts
assembled here would be considered unsatisfactory in that it lacks balance.
What journalists would mean by that is that all sides of the issue are not
represented.5 Our contributors include a journalist, a media lawyer, a
philosopher who specializes in the ethics of professions, and a law professor
who focuses on issues concerning the media. Personally, I see the topic as
an important aspect of public policy, a subject in which I have a strong
interest. In other words, we have two advocates for unrestricted freedom for
the media and two neutral observers of the scene. In case any reader has just
arrived here from Myanmar, China, outer space, or any other place where

1. A tiny sampling of the media reaction is instructive. New York Times columnist
William Safire retorted that the "[flault for Di's death is Fayed's." William Safire, Faultfor
Di's Death Is Fayed's, GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 8, 1997, at 6A. Boston Globe columnist
Ellen Goodman lamented the hostility to the media generated by the tragedy. Ellen Goodman,
In the Heavens with James Dean, GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 8, 1997, at 6A. A well-known
professor of media law in the University of Florida College of Journalism worried at
considerable length on the front page of the Sunday Issues Section of the Gainesville Sun.
Sandra Chance, Will Diana's Death Bring Foolish Laws?, GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 7, 1997,
at 1G.
2. The media seemed to worry even more about public reaction to media coverage of
the "Zippergate" scandal. Washington Post, Media Feel the Sting of Public Backlash,
GAINESVILLE SUN, Feb. 12, 1998, at 7A. New York Times columnist Russell Baker chimed
in: "The media is in trouble with this one." Russell Baker, The Media Is in Trouble with
This One, GAINESVILLE SUN, Feb. 1, 1998, at 3G. He concluded: "Whatever the outcome
of the scandal, the press and television figure to be big losers in the long run." Id. Scripps
Howard News Service columnist Martin Schram bemoaned the scandal-mongering mainstream
press for allowing their normal standards of verification to slide. Martin Schram, In the Race
for Headlines, GAINESVILLE SUN, Jan. 28, 1998, at 15A.

3. Cox Newspapers columnist Tom Teepen worries about creeping repression of the
media in response to public unhappiness with media coverage of celebrities and possible
involvement in tragedies such as the death of Princess Diana. Tom Teepen, Don't Throttle
Press to Curb Itself, GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 10, 1997, at 10A.
4. But, as Deborah Tannen observes, the overly critical posture of the media dries up the
flow of information by discouraging potential sources from being more forthcoming.
DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE TO DIALOGUE 68

(1998).
5. Deborah Tannen is scornful of the media practice that "the best way to cover news
is to find spokespeople who express the most extreme, polarized views and present them as
'both sides.' " Id. at 3.
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they are unaccustomed to press freedom, I should hasten to explain that our
lineup of contributors should not be taken as representative of the debate.
Critics of the media abound. Indeed, such criticism is so widespread and so
voluble that we who worked on putting this issue together had no worry that
any reader would be misled by the absence of a critic of the media. If any
reader feels the absence of that perspective, allow me to suggest a look at
Chapter Three of Deborah Tannen's most recent book.6 Her criticism is far
from the most damning available, but it should more than make up for the
absence of a media critic in our modest collaboration here.
How much endangered is our reliance on a free, unfettered, and reliable
media? On May 13, 1998, NBC's Emmy-award winning television drama
Law and Order focussed on the murder of a newspaper gossip columnist by
one of his targets. The prosecutors lost the case, despite a confession by the
killer. Seedy journalistic tactics were highlighted by the defense as they
persuaded the jury to return a verdict of the lowest degree of manslaughter
available. A premeditated murder was accorded a slap on the wrist, because
the victim was seen by the jury as deserving the fate he literally dared his
victims to wreak upon him. Was the drama shocking? Will there be outcry
from a public enraged at the sympathetic portrayal of the murderer? Should
we anticipate even mild protest at making the journalist the unattractive
victim? The standing of journalists in the opinion of the public is now so
low that we need not anticipate any media discussion of the episode. Even
Ted Koppel who likes to focus ABC's Nightline on issues of media behavior
and ethics from time to time can be expected to let this opportunity pass him
by. Outrage at some aspect of media behavior has become too commonplace
to deserve notice unless the occasion is truly outrageous.
I.

ADDRESSING (OR AVOIDING?) THE CHALLENGE OF

MEDIA LIBERTY

Against this backdrop of antipathy toward the media, I note a certain
sense of whistling through the graveyard by those who give no quarter in
their defense of what presently passes as journalism. Jane Kirtley, our lone
journalistic contributor to this issue, offers an unabashed apologia in defense
of the media along just such lines. Typically, however, her defense is cast,
not of the media as such, but as a vindication of the First Amendment. On
the importance of First Amendment protections, she will get no argument
from this quarter.7 Moreover, I have no doubt that her reminder of the

6. She titles Chapter Three: "From Lapdog to Attack Dog: The Aggression Culture and
the Press." TANNEN, supra note 4, at 54-94.
7. Any advocate of a free press should be concerned about reports of governmental
efforts to intimidate the media. For example, the Associated Press reported that the White
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worldwide threats to freedom of the press are a salutary corrective to any
temptations we might feel toward complacency.8
However, my qualms begin at her title: "The First Amendment: An
Inalienable Right or a Privilege to be Earned?" Just how "inalienable" a set
of rights does the First Amendment protect? In addition, there seems to be
a subtle shift from the assumption of inalienable rights to the immutability
of the interpretation of the First Amendment. Quite correctly, she observes
that the government cannot impose ethics on journalists, although private
persons and groups may seek to do so. The danger that courts or other
governmental bodies may then give legal import to voluntary ethical codes
concerns her greatly, so much so that she denies that such a thing could
happen under the First Amendment. But that is where the immutability
problem rears its ugly head. She worries about legislative attempts to alter
New York Times v. Sullivan,9 but what guarantee is there that the Court may
not narrow, distinguish, or even overrule that or other First Amendment
cases? Constitutional lawyers in the United States are fond of quoting the
phrase "the Supreme Court reads the newspapers."' 10 That cliche reminds
us not only that the Court too feels the influence of popular opinion, but also
that members of the Court may share the feelings of other public figures that
standards of journalistic ethics do not seem to be worthy of as much
protection as they might once have thought.
What is perfectly clear is the fact that constitutional jurisprudence is in
a constant state of flux, growing here, narrowing there. I have shown
elsewhere in some detail that strains of constitutional development may be
viewed as paradigms, which occupy the stage for a period of time and are
later superseded by new, sometimes dramatically different, developments."
In the light of that and many other studies, it is foolhardy to assume that
constitutional adjudication is likely to remain static for any significant period
House did exactly that, when Mrs. Clinton ordered "a taxpayer-financed analysis of what she
felt was biased reporting" by the lead Whitewater reporter for the Washington Post. Mrs.
Clinton Urged Report on Reporter, GAINESVILLE SUN, Feb. 15, 1998, at 6A. Russell Baker
comments that the media will have no friends left, given long-standing conservative harping
at the liberal bias of the media combined now with the constant sniping of Clinton's friends
at the supposed determination of the press to be a part of the conservative conspiracy to "get"
the President. Baker, supra note 2, at 3G.
8. But "[i]t is not death, or torture or imprisonment that threatens ... American
journalists; it is the trivialization of our industry." Richard Reeves, The Media: What's Up?,
GAINESVILLE SUN, Nov. 2, 1997, at 3G (quoting enthusiastically from a speech by Ted Koppel
to the annual dinner of the Committee to Protect Journalists).
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. The original quotation is somewhat different. "[N]o matther whether th' constitution
follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns." FINLEY PETER DUNNE,
MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1900).
11. Robert C.L. Moffat, Judicial Decision as Paradigm: Case Studies of Morality and
Law in Interaction, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 297-341 (1985).
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of time. Even the great positivist and cynic Oliver Wendell Holmes began
his work on The Common Law by advising us:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
in determining the rules by
good deal more to do than the syllogism
2
which men should be governed.'
Journalists may be faulted for their prejudices. We should likewise fault
judges for theirs. But the biases of judges may over time change the ground
rules upon which journalists operate. And journalists should not forget that
they are not immune to the impact of such developments.
All of the above does not even hint at the Hohfeldian problem. It is
popular to speak, as Ms. Kirtley does, of "rights" protected by the
Constitution, even of "inalienable" rights. Indeed, it is widely believed that
Americans have developed a preoccupation with rights.13 But are these
constitutional protections properly called rights? The analytical apparatus
developed by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld in his Fundamental Legal
Conceptions makes Ms. Kirtley's distinction between rights and privileges.'"
But his scheme seems to work best in the analysis of private law relations
between two parties. When one turns to public law or the interests of third
parties, Hohfeldian analysis grows fuzzy.' 5 In the case of the First
Amendment, we have both problems. It is clearly a matter of public law,
and in most cases, we have at least three parties to the dispute. For example,
we might have the government, a journalist, and a party aggrieved by the
journalist in some way. Journalists usually think of this situation as one in
which they worry that the government might compel them to provide a "right
of reply" to the aggrieved party. But if the aggrieved party buys up the
medium that employed the journalist and fires him, the First Amendment is
not affronted. No "right" of the journalist to a free press has been abridged.
By the same token, if the aggrieved party takes over another media outlet
12. OLIVER WENDELL
(1881).

HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW

1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1951)

13. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991); RICHARD E. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" IN OUR TIME (1984); THE FRAMERS AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Robert A. Licht ed. 1992); How DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE
RIGHTS? (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds. 1985).
14. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING (1978) (Walter Wheeler Cook ed. 1919).

15. I have treated this topic more extensively in Robert C.L. Moffat, Consent in Medical
Research: A RapporteurialCritique, in CONSENT, BEIHEFr NF 12, ARCHV FOR RECHTS- UND
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 212-21 (Sargent ed. 1979).
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and captures the audience by out sensationalizing the journalist, the journalist
can make no constitutional objection to his outlet being driven out of
business so that it no longer has a voice. I find Hohfeldian analysis
unreliable in constitutional situations, but it is clear that in Hohfeldian terms
it would often be more accurate to speak of First Amendment privileges than
of rights. That is because those who disagree with the journalist have "no
right" to interfere, but by the same token the journalist has "no right" that
they should cease efforts to outshout him. So far as Hohfeld is concerned,
both parties have a First Amendment privilege to try to promulgate their
respective views with correlative "no rights" in the other to prevent them in
their efforts.
II.

SHOULD JOURNALISTS PAY ATTENTION TO
SOCIAL RECIPROCITY?

Similar comments might be addressed to the remarks of Hugh Stevens
in his "Responsibility in the Media." Although he describes himself as a
media lawyer, his view of press responsibility is somewhat less partisan than
Ms. Kirtley's. Yet at bottom he agrees with her that the First Amendment
imposes no duty of responsibility on the media in exchange for the protection
it provides the media. 16 As a technical matter, they are both correct. What
they may overlook, however, is assumptions that may be made by the public,
governmental bodies, and the courts that there should be some kind of quid7
pro quo. Are there, in other words, expectations of tacit reciprocities?
The importance of that question lies in the fact that if journalists ignore the
expectations of others they may find themselves surprised by developments
in the legal arena. If other participants in the public forum perceive a
reciprocal duty on the part of the media to act responsibly in return for the
benefit of constitutional protections, the failure of the media to perform their
end of the tacit bargain could have dire consequences. So, while media
defenders are technically correct to rely on the current state of constitutional
law and disclaim any obligation to act responsibly, perhaps that view is
shortsighted. It might be wiser to teach journalists that they have an
unwritten obligation to act responsibly. They could be taught the valuable

16. Gregory Kane of the Baltimore Sun lauds the federal court of appeals ruling that the
First Amendment did not protect the publishers of a manual for hit men from liability for the
foreseeable consequences of their publication. Gregory Kane, Shattering Free-Speech Limits,
GAINESVILLE SUN, Dec. 2, 1997, at 1 A. Moreover, he laments the lack of responsibility
displayed by the publishers. Id. The predictable responding letter to the editor expressed
outrage at the notion that there should be any limits on free speech. Christopher Carney,
There Can Be No Compromise on the Civil Rights of Man, GAINESVILLE SUN, Dec. 12, 1997,

at 10B.
17. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 19-27 (rev. ed. 1969).
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lesson that acting in accordance with a moral obligation can forestall the
creation of a legal obligation to act perhaps in even less attractive ways.18
Stevens does offer some insights into media law that amount to a
qualification of some of Ms. Kirtley's alarms. He confides in us that in his
experience legal considerations do not often play a significant role in the
selection of journalistic content. Other factors are more important most of
the time. That observation is consistent with studies that have been done in
other areas of business life. In general, business people give nonlegal
considerations much greater weight than legal ones. 9 Stevens shares with
20
us his conclusion that the supposed chill that the laws of libel and privacy
have upon the delivery of news is greatly exaggerated. However, he does
agree with Ms. Kirtley regarding the importance of New York Times v.
Sullivan.2' He believes that many stories now are published that preSullivan libel law would have stopped in their tracks. That conclusion raises
an interesting question. Has the expansion of First Amendment press
protection made journalists less careful, more sloppy, thus leading indirectly
to the excesses we currently witness? Perhaps there will after all turn out to
be a tradeoff between press freedom and press responsibility. If the media
cannot succeed in convincing the public that it can police itself, the tacit
reciprocity mentioned above may emerge in reimposed limitations on the
scope of journalistic freedoms.
Stevens and Kirtley do agree that the only available remedy for
journalistic excesses is criticism of what we find objectionable, coupled with
the refusal to pay for trash.22 I fervently hope that the courts do not feel the
need to prove them wrong. But in order to avoid that nightmare, journalists
must find the capability to put the media house in order. Is the training
journalists receive helping to prepare them for such efforts? There is
certainly much contemporary criticism of the media from which willing

18. For further treatment of the interactive relationship between moral and legal
obligation, see Robert C.L. Moffat, Obligation to Obey the Law: Substance and Procedure
in the Thought of Lon Fuller, 1 INT'L J. APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Fall 1983, at 33.
19. The classic study was done by Stewart Macauley. Stewart Macauley, Noncontractual
Relations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV., Feb., 1963, at 55.
20. Universal Press Syndicate columnist William F. Buckley seems ambivalent regarding
proposals for greater protections of privacy. William F. Buckley, Curb the Press? Stop the
Presses?, GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 15, 1997, at 4A. Boston Globe columnist Ellen Goodman
expresses concern at the contrast between the lurid media coverage of Marv Albert's legal
troubles and their sudden sense of privacy when it came to failing to identify his accuser.
Media's Restraint a Little Uneasy, GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 27, 1997, at 9A.
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Scripps Howard News Service columnist Martin Schram thinks that "[o]nly consumers
can put an end to tabloid sleaze." Martin Schram, Only Consumers Can Put an End to
Tabloid Sleaze, GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 3, 1997, at 1 A.
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journalists might receive fruitful instruction.23 One indicator of prospects
for reform from within might be the extent to which such critical materials
are employed to positive effect in the training of journalists. On the other
hand, if such criticism is used negatively to demonstrate how the media is
threatened in order to build a siege mentality, prospects for reform from
within grow dim. Is that void likely to attract intervention from the courts
or other governmental agencies?
Ill.

DEALING WITH JOURNALISTIC BIAS

Professor Elliot Cohen considers two established approaches to
journalistic objectivity. The first is the attempt to be objective. This method
turns out to be impossible, in part because journalists become robots simply
repeating the input from valid news sources. 24 A further problem is the
difficulty of making an objective determination of which news sources are
valid. One reaction to those difficulties is to abandon objectivity in favor of
an all out subjective stance. Ironically, the journalist remains caught in the
necessity of reporting all perspectives that come within reach. The principal
difference is that the reporter is now free to add her own biases as part of the
multiple perspectives being offered. The difficulty is that there remains no
basis for choosing more reliable over less reliable perspectives. Indeed, the
tendency of contemporary journalism to balance all perspectives, no matter
how ridiculous the alternatives offered, provides a huge target for the
contempt of Deborah Tannen whose recent book was mentioned previously. 25 In pursuing this mindless quest for balancing, journalists will invite
a representative of the flat earth view to "balance" the input of a scientist
reporting on the latest findings by the Mars probe. We should not find it
surprising that Professor Cohen, a philosopher dedicated to the pursuit of
logic, also rejects the subjective approach.
Instead he proposes what he calls "rational subjectivity." This approach
accepts the impossibility of perfect objectivity, but rejects the flight into pure
subjectivity. He accepts the necessary presence of bias but believes that it
can be reduced by journalistic adherence to logic and rationality. In this
view, although logic cannot produce one demonstrably right answer,
23. Much of it can be found among media columnists as many of these footnotes
exemplify. E.g., Derrick Jackson, Will the News Media Ever Find Their Conscience?,
GAINESVILLE SUN,

Sept. 4, 1997, at 9A.

24. All too often, of course, the media may simply be a conduit for news releases from
important persons or institutions. For example, the charge is made that our local newspaper
quotes the opinions of the President of our university without obtaining other views. Charles
Montgomery, Talking Back: Sun Being Spoon-Fed, GAINESVILLE SUN, Nov. 3, 1997, at 4A.
25. She states: "The conviction that there are two sides to every story can prompt writers
or producers to dig up an "other side," so kooks who state outright falsehoods are given a
platform in public discourse." TANNEN, supra note 4, at 11.
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rationality can be employed to cull less persuasive arguments from ones that
are more persuasive. In this regard, Cohen's argument parallels developments in legal reasoning. There too it was once thought that there was a
stark choice between the formal logic of conceptualism and the skeptical
subjectivity of the radical legal realists. More recent developments have
turned lawyers' attentions to the informal logic of argumentation as a means
of persuasion of the legal audience. z6
Cohen's main focus, however, is not on argumentation as such, but on
the variety of biases lurking to derail the journalist's quest for rationality.
In that regard, he makes perhaps his most interesting point. Since awareness
of unconscious bias is one of the most important protections against falling
prey to irrationality, one might expect careful attention to be devoted to these
biases in schools of journalism. Shockingly, that is not the case. Study of
such common sources of bias is routinely omitted from the journalistic
curriculum. The result is that fledgling journalists do not receive training
that might help them learn to avoid the use of common stereotypes.27
Such an awareness, Professor Cohen believes, would enable journalists
to disclose information concerning the background for the generalizations
they offer. That information would in turn provide the reading public with
a useful basis for judging potential bias in the transmission of information.
Such background information would be particularly useful in evaluating
"news" that has been sensationalized. The practice of sensationalizing news
may have become so commonplace that such bias information would be of
almost constant use. In seeing journalistic efforts as a constant drive to
present news as a "battle" between opposing forces, Tannen shares the
concern that the media is failing to provide the reliable information we
should be entitled to expect from them.28
IV.

OFFERING CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS

Professor David Logan in his "'Stunt Journalism,' Professional Norms,
and Public Mistrust of the Media" provides the most comprehensive
assessment of the problems besetting the media and survey of possible
responses to those challenges. His article does not have space to include all
26. The work of the late Chaim Perelman is a prime example. E.g., CHAIM PERELMAN,
(1977); see Moffat, supra note 11,
at 312-16 for an extended discussion and critique of his contribution.
27. For further exploration of the overriding significance of stereotypes in one setting, see
Robert C.L. Moffat, Working Girls and Boy Toys: Disclosure of Gender Role Stereotypes, in
LAW AND THE CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGIES: NINTH ROUND TABLE ON LAW AND SEMIOTICS 18598 (Roberta Kevelson ed. 1996).
28. Tannen states: "Because of the belief that fights - and only fights - are
interesting, any news or information item that is not adversarial is less likely to be reported."
TANNEN, supra note 4, at 30.
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT
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the contemporary problems of the media, but he makes a good start. He
discusses the blurring of the line between news and entertainment and the
seamless mixing of soft and hard news. 29 These alarming developments are
due to the fact that news has come to be viewed as a profit center in the bean
counter driven consolidation of media centers into media giants which in turn
are amalgamating into mega- and multi-media empires. "Newspersons" have
become headline entertainers and are compensated accordingly, if they can
maintain satisfactory audience share ratings.30
Professor Logan
These developments have serious consequences.
expresses alarm at the growing hostility to the media, in part reflected in the
expanding jury verdicts obtained by targets of the media. That growth in
hostility is due in part, he believes, to the hypocrisy which the public
increasingly perceives in the frequent media double standard: embracing
undercover tactics for the media which they find outrageous when deployed
by others. Professor Logan's reason for being so concerned about the growth
of mistrust is that he believes the loss of credibility by the media equates to
growing cynicism on the part of the public, since they do not feel that they
can trust the information that is being offered to them.3" In such circumstances, viable public input in the ongoing debate on public policy is
bound to be ineffective. In short, the problems of the media are problems for
our democracy.
What is to be done? Would improved education of journalists help?
Professor Logan points out the tendency of journalists to belittle the
classroom. How about increasing efforts to generate a meaningful code of
ethics for journalists? Professor Logan details the way in which the
journalists have rejected specific standards to regulate their use of deception,
even when those standards were proposed by their own organization's
leadership. Instead, they adopted a generalized standard so watered-down as
to be meaningless.
This failure points to a larger problem. Professor Logan details the
reasons that journalism is not a profession. As he notes, one of the
characteristics of a profession is its dedication to the discipline of its
members according to a code of ethics imposed by the members of the

29. This problem has become so widely noted that it has even made it into Dr. Laura
Schlessinger's advice column. To the question whether there is any difference between gossip
and news media, she responds, "Your concerns are well founded. I believe that because the
news media is highly competitive, public people's lives are exploited for gossip in order to
boost ratings, viewership and readership." Dr. Laura Schlessinger, Dr. Laura, GAINESVILLE
SUN, Dec. 4, 1997, at 2D.
30. See, e.g., Richard Reeves, Now, the Nightly Entertainment,GAINESVILLE SUN, May
16, 1997, at 12A.
31. Deborah Tannen notes that when pollsters ask why the media are disliked, respondents
make the negativity of the press the most important reason. TANNEN, supra note 4, at 53.
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profession upon themselves. Journalists claim that they have been reticent
about adopting serious codes of ethics and the self-discipline that accompanies them, because they are afraid that courts might use their ethical
standards as a basis for judging their behavior. That fear is reasonable.
Courts, along with the rest of us, tend to take seriously the failure of a
member of a group to live up to the announced standards of that group.
But is journalistic fear of greater legal interference worth the unfettered
freedom that eschewing ethical standards is believed to bring? If journalists
adopted a serious code of ethics and disciplined their members accordingly,
it is quite possible that courts would develop constitutional doctrine toward
a two-tiered First Amendment analysis. In that analysis, greater deference
would be paid to journalistic behavior that met the ethical standards.
Behavior that did not would be subject to increased scrutiny. Such a
development is the leading feature of Ms. Kirtley's worst nightmare. But is
that development worse than the legal reaction we might anticipate if courts
and the public view all journalists as untrustworthy schemers who are eager
to use the most disgusting methods of deception in order to produce the most
sensationalized, and therefore profitable, result?
Professor Logan believes that media self-regulation is the only possible
hope for improvement in the standing of the media in the public eye.
Although he believes that there are several alternatives for self-regulation that
would avoid legal implications, it remains to be seen whether journalistic
antipathy to anything that even smells like regulation can be overcome.
Although Professor Logan believes that regulatory standards that include no
disciplinary measures could help to restore public confidence in the media,
I am doubtful. I am afraid that journalists have fostered so strong a public
cynicism that regulations without teeth would be perceived as mere window
dressing, as a weak effort at public relations.32 In short, the public would
see it as "spin," a cynical term which journalists have made a part of the
public vocabulary. Such toothless efforts might have had a chance for
success in an earlier, more innocent, age. But we have lost our innocence,
and the media bear a major responsibility for that loss.
I believe that the situation has grown so serious that only measures with
teeth have a chance to do the job. The adoption of real regulation does
increase the chance that such standards may come into play in future
litigation. But the alternative is to leave things as they are. That means that
ethical journalists along with the rest are subject to the danger that courts or

32. Molly Ivins takes the media to task for their shoddy reaction to Ted Turner's pledge
to donate $1 billion to United Nations humanitarian agencies: "When the largest single gift
anyone has ever given is greeted with contempt, cynicism, personal attacks and an insult to
one's wife, why would anyone bother to give money to a good cause?" Molly Ivins, Media
Snipes at Ted Turner's $1 Billion HumanitarianGift, GAINESVILLE SUN, Oct. 1, 1997, at 15A.
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legislatures will respond to the public mistrust of the media by cutting back
on current protections. Surely, the activities of the NationalEnquirer deserve
closer scrutiny than those of the Wall Street Journal.
But legal restrictions should not be the only source of worry. The Law
and Order episode mentioned at the beginning raises an important
unexamined question. Should journalists worry about private individuals
taking matters into their own hands? When the law fails to protect, vigilante
justice can sometimes be the response. Would it be prudent for journalists
to worry about their targets employing self-help? In the present state of low
public esteem for journalists, could a real person wreaking vengeance on a
tormenting journalist anticipate sympathetic jury treatment? The possibility
is not unimaginable.
How would the media respond? They always give front page attention
to harm that befalls journalists. A jury slap on the wrist to the target who
reacted violently to the journalist could be expected to receive even greater
attention. In the midst of all that media frenzy, no journalist would notice
the widespread publicity that was being given to the idea that victims of the
media could have their revenge. Journalists would unwittingly educate the
public in self-help. The possibility of violent reaction to the media
snowballing in such a fashion is something we can imagine. Compared with
such a scenario, media self-regulation with enforcement seems like a
preferable alternative. And it would still seem clearly preferable even if
adoption of a real code of ethics meant that judicial protection of the media
evolved in the direction of two-tiered First Amendment analysis.
V.

JOURNALISM AND THE PRIME DIRECTIVE

All watchers of any of the many versions of Star Trek know that the
prime directive of the explorers of new worlds is that they must not interfere
with the development of the civilization that they observe. Journalists
sometimes imagine that they adhere to such a neutral observer stance, but our
experience is that what they do can have profound impacts on the society,
just through the information, opinions, and values they convey. What is
more, we know that modern aggressive newsgathering techniques often create
situations for the purpose of manufacturing "news." All of the controversial
tactics of undercover operations and other deceptions that pass for "investigative" reporting fall into this same pattern.3 3 In other words, journalists
have become about as involved in the newsmaking process as is possible.

33. Yet precious little investigation is going on. More than 40% of reportage consists
only of opinion, analysis, or speculation. Much of the rest is only dissemination of press
releases, information obtained without newsgathering effort. Richard Reeves, ATM News: No
Reporters, Lots 0' Cash, GAINESVILLE SuN, Feb. 22, 1998, at 3G.
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Neutral observation is a distant memory for which we may feel nostalgia
when listening to the comments of Daniel Schorr on National Public Radio's
All Things Considered. Notably, he is always careful to label his thoughtful
contributions as his personal views.
Could a prime directive be reimposed? I do not believe that the genie
can be put back into the bottle. Ironically, aggressive journalism means that
any self-help efforts by journalistic targets would receive maximum publicity.
Is it even impossible to imagine some journalists paying to witness an
aggrieved target taking revenge on the other journalists who had offended
him? The feeding frenzy 34 can easily turn upon itself as the paparazzi
shadowing Princess Diana's car discovered to their dismay.3
Journalists are fond of responding to criticism of their activities by
pointing out that they only reflect the society they observe. That defense is
disingenuous, of course, because they also help to create that society by the
messages - true, false, and misleading - with which they saturate it. It is
clearly true that a large audience would tune in to watch a distraught parent
blow away the paparazzi believed to be responsible for their child's death.
We know that is true, because of the ability that the media has demonstrated
for finding a market for sensationalism. 36 No doubt that same audience
would tune in to witness journalists being slaughtered, the more violently the
better. Such a show would surely out draw staged fights such as those on
similar programs: "professional wrestling" or Jerry Springer. If journalists
continue to say that they are only reflecting society, we can expect the
downward spiral to continue. If society is to improve, journalism must. The
time has come for journalists to realize that, by adopting an enforceable code
of ethics, they can not only clean up the image of journalism but can
contribute significantly to the improvement of society as well. Media
responsibility in part means accepting responsibility for the social consequences both of media behavior and of misbehavior.

34. The problem has grown so notorious that even the editorial page editor of our smalltown local paper now worries about pack journalism. Ron Cunningham, Running with the
Pack Is Fun -

and Seductive, GAINESVILLE SUN, Feb. 1, 1998, at 3G.

35. E.g., A.M. Rosenthal, They Have Blood on Their Hands, GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 4,
1997, at 8A (New York Times column).
36. Some journalists are entirely unapologetic regarding media excesses in covering
celebrities, even including the late Princess Diana. See Dan Lynch, No Sympathy for Spotlight
Seekers, GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 4, 1997, at 9A (Albany Times Union column).
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